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ABSTRACT
Machine learning-based malware detection dominates current
security defense approaches for Android apps. However, due to the
evolution of Android platforms and malware, existing such
techniques are widely limited by their need for constant retraining
that are costly, and reliance on new malware samples that may not
be timely available. As a result, new and emerging malware slips
through, as seen from the continued surging of malware in the
wild. Thus, a more practical detector needs not only to be accurate
but, more critically, to be able to sustain its capabilities over time
without frequent retraining.
In this paper, we study how Android apps evolve as a
population over time, in terms of their behaviors related to
accesses to sensitive information and operations. We first perform
a longitudinal characterization of 6K benign and malicious apps
developed across seven years, with focus on these sensitive
accesses in app executions. Our study reveals, during the long
evolution, a consistent, clear differentiation between malware and
benign apps regarding such accesses, measured by relative
statistics of relevant method calls. Following these findings, we
developed DroidSpan, a novel classification system based on a new
behavioral profile for Android apps. Through an extensive
evaluation, we showed that DroidSpan can not only effectively
detect malware but sustain high detection accuracy (93% F1
measure) for four years (with 81% F1 for five years). Through a
dedicated study, we also showed its resiliency to sophisticated
evasion schemes. By comparing to a state-of-the-art malware
detector, we demonstrated the largely superior sustainability of
our approach at reasonable costs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing dominance of Android among mobile computing
platforms [30] is accompanied by its share of the vast majority
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(over 90%) of all mobile malware [1]. In response to the continued
surge of malware in different markets of Android applications
(known as apps), there has been a growing body of defense
solutions against malware [17, 36] being proposed. A major
defense technique has been app classification based on machine
learning (ML), which identifies malware by predicting a given app
as benign or malicious [8, 19, 21, 22, 32].
Typically a ML-based classification approach works by first
training a classifier based on a set of features extracted from
labeled sample apps, and then applying the trained classifier to
unlabeled apps using the same feature set. Thus, the key step of
such approaches is the extraction of app features that constitute a
behavior profile for apps. Existing approaches have explored
various kinds of features, computed through static [5, 7, 33, 42, 43],
dynamic [3, 15], or hybrid [13, 31] app analysis. Mostly, the
features are based on apps usage of permissions [13, 31, 33] and/or
APIs [2, 5, 7, 40, 42, 43]. However, due to the evolution of attack
strategies of Android malware [34] classifiers built on these
features may not be sustainable—they would need to be retrained
constantly for later use, or their performance would downgrade
immensely. Retraining a learning model often implies feature
computation on new samples, which dominates the total cost of
classification. More critically, new samples (malicious ones in
particular) may not be always available for retraining the classifier
to detect emerging malware.
Amost recent technique,MamaDroid [26] detects malware based
on abstracted API calls. It achieved high accuracy (up to 99%) when
the training and testing apps were developed in the same period
of time, as many previous approaches did. The main advantage of
MamaDroid lies in its avoidance of continuous retraining: it can
detect malware appeared (N years) after training, and thus attained
the state-of-the-art sustainability. Yet, MamaDroid kept reasonably
good performance for only one year. Its detection accuracy dropped
noticeably over time, to 75% for N = 2 and below 50% for N ≥ 3.
In this paper, we propose a new behavioral profile for Android
apps, called sensitive access distribution (SAD), that models their
run-time behaviors by capturing quickly-exposed patterns of
accesses to sensitive data and operations through short tracing.
Given an app, the SAD profile characterizes its execution in terms
of the extent and distribution of invocations of sources and sinks,
and those of sensitive control flows at method level. Each SAD
profile is described by 52 dynamic features, computed only from
the trace of all method calls in the app that are exercised during
the tracing. Thus, the profile construction does not need static
analysis but only straightforward, lightweight bytecode
instrumentation. With respect to this dynamic profile, we have
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performed a longitudinal characterization of 6K benign and
malicious apps collected across the past seven years, in order to
understand their behavioral evolution. Based on the SAD profile,
we also have developed DroidSpan, a novel system for malware
detection aiming at superior sustainability over existing
approaches.
Our characterization reveals that sensitive accesses are
prevalently executed in all apps over all the examined years, with
expected lower extent and frequency of use in benign apps than in
malware. Also, in terms of the functionalities of these accesses,
network information and account settings are the top dominating
data and operations accessed, respectively, in both benign and
malicious apps (but again with less extent of use in benign apps).
From an evolution perspective, benign apps tend to be much more
stable than malware in terms of the whole SAD profile. Most
notably, despite the fluctuation in both malware and benign and
evolution of the Android system itself, there was a clear and
consistent separation in this profile between the these two groups
over the years.
We have extensively evaluated the performance of DroidSpan
against 5K real-world apps, with both cross validation and
independent testing (for new/unseen samples). Our evaluation
shows that DroidSpan achieves the level of classification accuracy
comparable or superior to in contrast to existing systems such as
MamaDroid, when testing apps developed in the same time period
as the training data. Notably, DroidSpan maintained high accuracy
(F-measure of over 93%) after as long as four years, and still kept a
reasonable performance (F-measure of 82%) even five years after
training. We further demonstrated the resilience of DroidSpan to
malware evasion schemes by evaluating it on a benchmark suite of
obfuscated apps, on which DroidSpan sustained the same level of
classification capabilities. With the same dataset and evaluation
settings, MamaDroid sustained over 90% accuracy for one year
only while not able to work on any of the obfuscated benchmarks.
Notably, our characterization findings essentially explained the
sustaining capabilities of our technique.
The main contributions of this work include:
• A longitudinal characterization of run-time sensitive accesses
by Android apps spanning seven years, which sheds new light
on the evolutionary patterns of application security behaviors
in Android.
• A novel malware detection approach DroidSpan based on a new
behavioral profile, sensitive access distribution, for Android apps
defined by a small feature set, which captures quickly-exposed
sensitive access patterns in shortly traced app executions.
• An extensive evaluation of DroidSpan, which shows its
comparable classification performance for same-period
detection, but greatly superior sustainability and resiliency in
contrast to the state-of-the-art malware detection system, at
reasonable costs.
• An open-source implementation of DroidSpan and shared
experimental datasets (link withheld), which facilitate
replication of this work and development of future works on
app security.
2 PROBLEM AND MOTIVATION
ML-based classification has been a major approach to Android
malware detection. This approach also has been successful with
high accuracy, yet mostly only for classifying apps developed in
the same time period as the training data. The reason is that both
the attack strategies of malware and the platforms of Android
itself evolve rapidly. As a result, the classifier needs to be
constantly retrained with new malware samples (i.e., they are not
sustainable). Developing a sustainable malware detector is crucial
for Android because otherwise the detector, without retraining,
would not be able to identify new malware, which presently
continues to emerge and surge. Even if retraining is an option, it is
not always practical because getting training samples for emerging
malware may not be possible. Meanwhile, the cost of computing
features and training typically dominates the total detection cost.
Systems like MudFlow [7] did not rely on malware samples but
suffered from relatively low detection accuracy (86%) and high
overheads while their sustainability was not clear. The
state-of-the-art malware detector with demonstrated sustainability,
MamaDroid [26], made important advance in this regard, yet it
only sustained high accuracy for one year. Our experience showed
that retraining MamaDroid is highly expensive in both time and
storage.
We thus set out to first understand howAndroid apps evolve over
a long period of time in a longitudinal characterization study. We
then leverage the findings from the study to develop a sustainable
malware detector. We show how and why our approach works,
both technically and empirically.
3 DYNAMIC SAD PROFILE
Underlying both our characterization study and DroidSpan is the
dynamic SAD profile, a new behavioral model of Android apps that
characterizes the run-time accesses to sensitive data (by invoking
sources) and operations (by invoking sinks). Next, we describe the
defining metrics (i.e., features) of a SAD profile and how the profile
is constructed for an app.
3.1 SAD Profile Definition
The SAD profile of an app is defined by 52 features, much simpler
than the app profiles used by most existing ML-based app classifiers
(which often use tens of thousands of features, e.g., 150K in the
best-performing mode ofMamaDroid). The central focus of all these
features is on the distribution of source/sink invocations, albeit
they fall in three classes each addressing a different perspective: (1)
the overall extent of sensitive access in terms of total source/sink
invocations, (2) the categorization of invoked sensitive accesses in
terms of the categories of data retrieved by the calls to sources, and
the categories of operations performed by the calls to sinks, and (3)
the method-level control flows that potentially carry out execution
paths reaching to sink calls from source calls.
Table 1 gives a summary definition of the features that
constitute a SAD profile, with the sizes (in parentheses) of each
feature subset. All features are consistently percentages of calls in
one group over those in total. We use these relative statistics
instead of sheer numbers in order to capture the general patterns of
app behaviors in sensitive accesses. We examine each app trace in
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Table 1: Features (52) that constitue a SAD profile
Features Description (percentage of)
Extent of sensitive accesses
Total source/sink
callsites (2)
callsites targeting sources (resp. sinks) over all
callsites.
Total source/sink
call instances (2)
instances of calls to sources (resp. sinks) over
all call instances.
Categorization of sensitive data and operations accessed
Sensitive callsite
distribution (11)
callsites targeting sources (resp. sinks) that are
in each category (out of 5, resp. 6) over all source
(resp. sink) callsites.
Distribution of
sensitive call
instances (11)
instances of calls to sources (resp. sinks) that
are in each category (out of 5, resp. 6) over all
source (resp. sink) call instances.
Sensitive (potentially vulnerable) method-level control flows
Vulnerable
source/sink
callsites (2)
callsites targeting vulnerable sources (resp.
vulnerable sinks) over source (resp. sink)
callsites.
Vulnerable
source/sink call
instances (2)
instances of calls to vulnerable sources (resp.
vulnerable sinks) over all source (resp. sink) call
instances.
Vulnerable callsite
distribution (11)
callsites targeting vulnerable sources (resp.
vulnerable sinks) that are in each category (out
of 5, resp. 6) over all vulnerable source (resp.
sink) callsites.
Distribution of
vulnerable call
instances (11)
instances of calls to vulnerable sources (resp.
vulnerable sinks) that are in each category (out
of 5, resp. 6) over all source (resp. sink) call
instances.
two complementary views: callsite view concerning unique
callsites regardless of the times a callsite is invoked, and instance
view counting all call instances. For each feature in the callsite
view, there is a dual feature in the instance view.
An app may invoke sources and sinks for legitimate purposes.
Thus, source/sink invocations can only be regarded as sensitive but
not necessarily vulnerable. We consider a source vulnerable if it
reaches at least one sink callsite, and a sink vulnerable if there is
at least one invoked source that reaches the sink, both through
method-level control flows (i.e., dynamic call sequences). While a
conservative (imprecise) approximation, the reachability based on
control flows at method level is cheaper to compute and potentially
more resilient to malware evasions [25], compared to tracking
sensitive data flows [7]. This is also supported by our evaluation
results with obfuscated benchmarks. Note that we do not count the
numbers of sensitive flows (nor compute all of them) but only use
the reachability in the SAD profile.
We categorize sensitive data accesses with respect to five
categories of information sources mostly retrieve (i.e., Account,
Calendar, Location, Network info, and System configurations). We
also categorize sensitive operations with respect to six categories
of operations sinks mostly perform (i.e., Account setting, File
operation, Logging, Network access, Messaging, and System setting).
We chose these categorizes because they were the predominant
Table 2: Overview of our datasets
Category Name Year(s) #A.S. #C.S. #E.S.
Benign
apps
oldBen 2010-2014 1,221 1,111 1063
newBen 2017 2,210 2,048 1612
total 2010-2017 3,431 3,159 2,675
Malware
oldMal 2010-2012 2,000 1,833 1591
Mal13 2013 415 399 335
Mal14 2014 160 142 135
Mal15 2015 119 115 115
Mal16 2016 203 184 146
Mal17 2017 104 102 101
total 2010-2017 3,001 2,775 2,423
All apps total 2010-2017 6,432 5,934 5,098
ones according to our previous empirical study in this
regard [9, 11].
3.2 SAD Profile Construction
Constructing the SAD profile for an app is reduced to extracting
the 52 features from the app. We use our Android app
characterization toolkit [10, 12] based on Soot [23] for the
extraction. First, the app is instrumented for tracing. To overcome
the vulnerability of static analysis to code obfuscation, we probe
for invocation of all methods in the APK bytecode, including those
in exception-handling constructs (e.g., catch and finally blocks)
and those invoked via reflection. Next, the instrumented app is
exercised with automatically generated test inputs for T minutes.
Lastly, all the features are computed from the collected trace. To
identify the calls to sources and sinks from the trace, we use the
source/sink lists generated by SUSI [28] and our manual
categorization that refines the original one [11, 12].A dynamic call
graph with call-frequency annotations is built to facilitate
computing the features, especially those based on the statistics
about vulnerable sources and sinks. Note that since we use very
large and conservative lists of predefined (18K) sources and (7.2K)
sinks, we consider accesses in apps sensitive very conservatively
(which is reasonable for detecting malware).
4 DATASETS & CHARACTERIZATION
To understand how the sensitive accesses in Android apps evolve,
we collected real-world app samples from early 2010 to mid 2017,
and characterized them in terms of their SAD profiles. We first
introduce the characterization datasets and then highlight themajor
findings from the study.
4.1 Datasets
Table 2 gives an overview of our study datasets, including numbers
of all samples downloaded (#A.S.), samples characterized (#C.S.),
and samples used in the evaluation of our technique (#E.S.).
The first set of 1,221 benign apps (oldBen) was collected by
downloading the top 50 popular apps in each app category on
Google Play in late 2014. The new benign data set (newBen) was
obtained by downloading the top 100 popular apps in each of the
app categories on Google Play by May, 2017. The oldMal malware
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set was obtained by randomly selecting 2,000 apps from the Drebin
dataset [5]. The Mal17 set consists of 104 new malware in the wild
we manually collected from various sources. The malware sets for
2013 through 2016 consists of all apps from respective years in the
AndroZoo dataset [4] that were identified as malware by ≥ 32 AV
tools (out of 63) of VirusTotal [38] as recorded there.
Our entire datasets include 3,431 benign and 3,001 malicious
samples, for a total of 6,432 benchmarks. Constructing the SAD
profile for some of these benchmarks were not successful. Most of
those failing cases were due to missing assets in APKs and thus
cannot be executed for tracing. Among others, some either have
corrupted APKs (which cannot be unpacked for analysis) or cannot
be instrumented due to the inability of Soot to process their
bytecode; the rest cannot be installed or did not produce a a useful
trace (i.e., having non-zero line coverage). The #C.S. column of
Table 2 lists the numbers of samples in each dataset for which we
were able to obtain a meaningful SAD profile (we used one profile
per benchmark app). These apps (valid samples), a total of 5,934,
were used in our characterization study. We elaborate on the
numbers of the last column in Section 6.1.
4.2 Experimental Settings
We produced the SAD profile of each valid sample by running
the instrumented app on an Android emulator (Nexus One), with
SDK 6.0 (API 23), 2G RAM, and 1G SD storage. The emulator ran
on an Ubuntu (15.04) desktop of 16G memory and 8-core 2.6GHz
CPU. Each app was exercised for ten minutes by the random inputs
generated by Monkey [20]. We used Monkey because it achieves
an average code coverage at least comparable to other existing
alternatives (research prototypes) while with the best usability and
reliability.We choseT = 10 instead of a longer time in consideration
of the time expense of the study given the large number of apps,
and the previous finding that Monkey attained its highest coverage
in ten minutes in an average case [14]. To minimize bias, we run
each app in a fresh emulator setting (by restarting a clean emulator
for each app).
The total trace size of all valid sample SAD profiles is about
128GB. Collecting the traces took over an effective time of three
months. The line coverage of the per-sample traces ranged from
1.8% to 97.1%, for a mean of 48.2%, standard deviation of 22.1%, and
median of 50.1%. With our toolkit, a real Android device can be
easily plugged in to produce traces for DroidSpan as well. We used
an emulator in order to test the robustness of our dynamic
detection approach to malware evasion techniques targeting
dynamic analysis (e.g., hiding malicious behaviors when they
detected being run on an emulator) [29].
4.3 Evolutionary Characteristics
Wepresent themost important results of our characterization, based
on the SAD profiles of 5,934 apps (3,159 benign and 2,775 malicious)
over the past seven years. To understand the evolutionary patterns
of sensitive accesses of Android apps, we computed the summary
statistics for each of the 8 datasets separately and compare among
them.
4.3.1 Evolution in Use Extent. Figure 1 shows the patterns
regarding the extent of those accesses in terms of source and sink
calls in both the callsite and instance views. In each chart, we show
the average-case SAD profiles for benign versus malicious apps,
separately, with respect to all the characterization datasets. Since
we are interested in comparing the means, we computed the 0.95
confidence interval for each mean to estimate how these sample
means approximate those of the respective populations. Data
points underlying these means are values of corresponding
features (see Table 2).
The first four charts indicate that the sensitive accesses were
substantial (given our conservative definition of such accesses) in
all the benchmarks studied, in either views. Among all method
invocations, calls to sources were even more extensive than calls
to sinks (20-80% versus 5-40%), partly because the predefined list of
sources is much larger than the list of sinks we referred to. Partly
due to the same reason, as the next four charts show, percentages
of sources that can reach sinks (i.e., vulnerable sources) were much
lesser compared to vulnerable sinks (1-7% versus 10-20%): the
dominators for the former were much larger. As expected, benign
apps had generally less extensive accesses to sensitive information
and operations than malware, both in terms of the diversity of
source/sink APIs invoked (i.e., the callsite view) and the frequency
of those API calls (i.e., the instance view). In contrast to these
numbers themselves, however, the more important is the
evolutionary trends revealed by the comparison of these numbers
over the years, which we discuss below.
Evolution of benign apps. While we only studied two benign
datasets, they were at least 3 years apart. Figure 1 shows that over
this period of time, sensitive accesses in benign apps tend to drop,
but only slightly (by less than 5%) in terms of callsites and call
instances targeting sinks and call instances targeting sources. An
exception was the trend in terms of source callsites (chart (a)):
benign apps of 2017 had tiny increase in this feature compared to
three years ago. Thus, it appeared that benign apps were making a
little more diverse source API calls, but less frequently overall ((c)).
Evolution of malware.Malware experienced ups and downs in
sensitive accesses with respect to any of the 8 metrics depicted in
Figure 1. Interestingly, over the years, malicious apps tend to
increase in the extent of these accesses at some point but then
drop, eventually lower than the early time. Consider vulnerable
sink call instances (chart (h)) for example, from 2010 through 2014,
the extent grew continuously (from 12 to 18%) and then kept
decreasing afterwards (by 11%). Despite the different scales (y
axis), the gaps between 2010 and 2017 revealed that the malware
reduced significantly in the diversity of sensitive APIs invoked, but
relatively lesser in the frequency of such calls. An implication of
this observation is that malware tended to concentrate on a
smaller set of APIs for sensitive access.
Benign versus malware. Most importantly, regardless of the
fluctuations seen by both malware and benign apps, the differences
in the extent of sensitive accesses between the two groups were
very consistent: a visual horizontal dividing line between them
could be drawn in any of the charts of Figure 1. In other words,
while both have changed within the group, the patterns of the
differences appeared to be quite stable, suggesting the 8 metrics to
be able to consistently differentiate malware from benign apps.
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Figure 1: Mean percentage of calls for sensitive accesses, y axis) over years (x axis) in benign apps (circle) and malware (dia-
mond). Error bars show the 0.95 confidence intervals of the means.
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Figure 2: Mean percentage of source call instances (y axis) that accesses network information (left), and of sink call instances
(y axis) that perform account settings (right), over years (x axis) in benign apps (circle) and malware (diamond). Error bars
show the 0.95 confidence intervals of the means.
4.3.2 Evolution in Dominating Categories. Most of the features
in our SAD profile concern the categories of source/sink APIs
associated with the sensitive accesses. Our results clearly indicate
that in both malware and benign apps, among all sources exercised,
the dominating ones were those retrieving network information,
while calls to sinks related to account settings dominated all sink
calls. This observation was consistent regardless of the views and
whether the sources/sinks were vulnerable or not.
Figure 2, in the format as Figure 1, depicts the evolutionary
trends concerning these two dominating categories of sensitive
access, in terms of all call instances to sources (left) and sinks
(right). Compared to the use extent, the means had wider
confidence intervals, meaning that these numbers were more
approximate and there were larger variations among individual
apps within each dataset. Nevertheless, the average-case metrics
still clearly reveal consistent patterns as seen above. Sensitive
accesses in benign apps exhibited an almost unchanged focus on
the two top categories. In contrast, malware again saw more
variations over the years, experiencing ups and downs like in the
overall use extent. However, the fluctuations were much smaller in
general. Finally and most importantly, the clear division between
the benign apps and malware was quite consistent over years
(albeit the gaps were larger at some points than at others). We
have observed similar patterns in benign apps and malware
separately, and in the consistent differentiation between the two
groups, in other source/sink categories as well.
5 THE DROIDSPAN SYSTEM
This section presents DroidSpan, our novel Android app
classification approach using supervised learning based on the
defining features of the SAD profile.
Overview of approach. DroidSpan is a dynamic malware
detection system based on the SAD profile. Like existing ML-based
app classification systems, DroidSpan works in two major phases:
training and testing. In the training phase, it relies on a set of
labeled app samples to build a prediction model. Then in the
testing phase, the trained model is applied to classify novel apps.
Our main goal with and motivation for DroidSpan, however, is that
this model can be used effectively (i.e., with high classification
performance) some time after it is trained, so that emerging
malware can be discovered by the system without being retrained
on samples for the new malware. Intuitively, the longer the time
span the better, and more sustainable the system.
To make the prediction model sustainable, the key is that the
underlying features can, for a relatively long period of time,
distinguish benign apps from malware To that end, DroidSpan uses
the features that define the SAD profile of an Android app
(Table 1). Our longitudinal characterization (Section 4.3) shows
that, with the evolution of malware attack strategies and the
Android system, benign apps and malware developed in different
years tends to exhibit generally similar behaviors in terms of their
SAD profile. Moreover, the discrimination between both groups
appeared to be clearly consistent. These findings provide an
essential grounding for DroidSpan to achieve sustainable
classification over years.
Feature extraction. Extracting the SAD features is needed both
for obtaining the sample set for training DroidSpan and for later
predicting the label of a novel app usingDroidSpan. We compute the
features of all training and testing apps as described in Section 3.
Classification. To find the best ML model for DroidSpan, we have
performed a comparative study of DroidSpan variants using most
of the supervised classification models provided by the Scikit-learn
library [27]. These models include: random forest (RF), support
vector machines (SVM) with both linear and radial basis function
kernels, decision trees/C4.5 (DT), k-nearest neighbours (kNN),
naive Bayes (NB) with three possible probability models (Gaussian,
Multinomial Bernoulli), AdaBoost, Gradient Tree Boosting, Extra
Trees, and the Bagging classifier. By comparing these variants of
DroidSpan with respect to classification performance (precision,
recall, and F1-measure), we found that RF consistently achieved
the best performance on any of our datasets. Thus, we chose RF as
the learning algorithm for DroidSpan. DroidSpan is first trained on
benign apps labeled as BENIGN and malicious apps all labeled as
MALICIOUS, and then classifies a novel app as either of the two
labels.
6 EVALUATION
We assessed DroidSpan in terms of classification performance and
efficiency, versus MamaDroid. We chose MamaDroid as the
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baseline approach because it is a state-of-the-art ML-based
malware detection system and shares a similar goal to ours (i.e.,
sustainable detection). Also, both systems use features based on
API calls in an app, albeit MamaDroid extracts features with static
analysis, using FlowDroid [6] to build call graphs while DroidSpan
is based on pure dynamic analysis.
Our evaluation consists of two main separate studies. In Study I,
we assess the performance of DroidSpan with training and testing
apps developed in a same period of time (referred to as same-period
detection). In Study II, we focus on evaluating the sustainability of
DroidSpan by assessing its performance when it is trained on older
datasets and tests newer ones, spanning one to five years (referred
to as detection over time). We performed an additional study, Study
III, to assess the resiliency of DroidSpan to sophisticated obfuscation
schemes adopted in modern Android apps (malware in particular).
6.1 Used Benchmarks
We started with the same valid samples as described in (the #C.S.
column of) Table 2.MamaDroid failed to analyze some samples due
to the limitation of its underlying analysis by FlowDroid (as the
authors discussed [26]). For a fair comparison, we removed those
samples to make sure the comparison is based on exactly the same
datasets. The #E.S. column of Table 2 lists the remaining samples in
each dataset that were eventually used in our evaluation studies.
Assessing the performance of both techniques needs mixed
datasets each consisting of both malware and benign apps. Thus,
we used several combinations of characterization datasets for our
evaluation. Specifically, for Study I, we combined the oldBen set
with relatively older malware sets (oldMal, Mal13, and Mal14), and
newBen set with relatively newer malware sets (Mal15, Mal16, and
Mal17). Thus, we had six mixed datasets each covering a different
malware set. In addition, we consider all the available benchmarks
constituting an all-data set.
For Study II, we used the combinations of malware and benign
datsets such that we take the oldest malware set (oldMal) for
training to test each of the newer malware sets. In this way, we
can test the sustainability of the two techniques for the longest
possible time span with respect to our datasets. We used the two
benign sets, separately for two repetitions of this study.
We used an additional dataset, named MalObf, for Study III. This
dataset was obtained from the Contagio subset in the Praguard
obfuscation benchmark suite [25]. It initially includes 237
malicious apps that each adopted three obfuscation schemes
together: encryption, renaming, and reflection. For 17 of these
apps, DroidSpan failed to produce valid SAD profiles. Thus, MalObf
consists of 220 samples used in Study III.
6.2 Methodology
In our evaluation, we gauged the performance of DroidSpan versus
the baseline in terms of three metrics: precision, recall, and
F1-measure (accuracy), as defined below.
Give an app p under classification, p is a true positive (TP) if the
true label is L (i.e., BENIGN or MALICIOUS) and the predicted class
label is L; it is a false positive (FP) if the true label is not L and the
predicted label is L; it is a true negative (TN) if the true label is not L
but the predicted label is not L, it is a false negative (FN) if the true
Table 3: Comparison of cross-validation results between the
two techniques.
Dataset
DroidSpan (our work) MamaDroid [26]
P R F1 P R F1
all-data 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.945 0.942 0.943
oldBen+oldMal 0.948 0.948 0.946 0.960 0.960 0.958
oldBen+Mal13 0.948 0.948 0.946 0.926 0.926 0.923
oldBen+Mal14 0.939 0.933 0.929 0.935 0.931 0.923
newBen+Mal15 0.981 0.981 0.980 0.982 0.981 0.980
newBen+Mal16 0.986 0.986 0.985 0.970 0.972 0.970
newBen+Mal17 0.977 0.980 0.974 0.971 0.972 0.968
Overall average 0.959 0.959 0.956 0.956 0.955 0.952
label is L and the predicated label is not L. Accordingly, regardless of
the number of classes (different labels) in the model: Precision (P ) =
T P
T P+FP , Recall (R) =
T P
T P+FN , and F1 = 2∗ P∗RP+R . For evaluating malware
detection, these metrics are computed concerning L=MALICIOUS
only.
In Study I, for each of totally seven evaluation datasets, we
compute results from a 10-fold CV to facilitate comparison with
the baseline (which was partially evaluated so originally). We
further performed an independent testing using the biggest dataset
(all-data). Specifically, we randomly selected 30% samples from
each class (malware or benign) in this dataset and reserved them as
unseen/novel samples. By doing so, we intend to test the capability
of both techniques in classifying new apps (albeit from the same
time period as the training set) and to complement the CV results.
For Study II, we used each of the mixed evaluation datasets
considered for this study, as either training or testing data. Since
there were no intersections between each pair of these training
and testing datasets, this study essentially performs independent
testings.
In Study III, we used the entire MalObf set for testing and the
oldBen+oldMal set for training. These two datasets do not have
any common apps. Thus, this study also performs an independent
testing.
Both techniques used the same RF algorithm. For DroidSpan, we
used 100 estimators and left other parameters as default in
Scikit-learn. For MamaDroid, we used the parameters as described
in [26]. MamaDroid was developed to work in two modes. For ease
of comparison, we simply report the best results of any mode in
our evaluation results for MamaDroid. We used the same
experimental settings for all evaluation studies as for the
characterization (Section 4.2).
6.3 Study I: Same-Period Detection
In this study, we aimed to gauge the performance for classifying
apps developed in the same period of time as were the training
samples. As mentioned earlier, we used both 10-fold CV and
independent testing for this evaluation.
Cross validation. Table 3 lists the validation results of our
approach versus the baseline, in terms of the three classification
performance metrics described earlier: precision (P), recall (P), and
F1 measure (F1). Each row of the table shows these metrics for
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both techniques obtained from one of the seven datasets (first
column), except for that the last row shows the simple averages of
the numbers in the same column. To facilitate comparison, on any
dataset, the higher metrics are marked in bold face. Note that each
number was the average of numbers of the same metric across the
ten passes of the 10-fold CV, and the F1 measures were the
averages of per-pass F1 instead of being computed from the
averaged precisions and recalls.
Overall, the numbers between the two compared approaches
are very close for any specific dataset and individual metrics. In
general, both techniques performed well for same-period
detection, achieving 93 99% F1 accuracy. Either technique had
better performance at some datasets than the other. By overall
average, DroidSpan had slightly higher performance than the
baseline. However, the differences were quite small, especially in
terms of the F1 measure. In sum, the cross validation suggests that
both techniques have no significant difference in classification
performance.
Independent testing. As a known limitation, cross validation
may suffer from biases in its results due to possible overfitting. To
complement with an independent testing, we used 70% of
benchmarks in the all-data set to train both techniques, and then
tested against them with the other samples in this set. Our results
show again similar results between the two techniques compared,
with DroidSpan obtaining a 95.6% F1 accuracy versus the baseline
number of 94.7% by MamaDroid. Thus, the independent testing
confirmed that both techniques performed almost equally well
(without significant difference).
In all, through two evaluation strategies, we note that DroidSpan
can obtain high-accuracy for same-period detection, comparable to
a state-of-the-art approachMamaDroid. It is also worth mentioning
that, despite the different datasets used, the same-period detection
performance results we obtained in this study were almost the same
to what were reported in the original evaluation ofMamaDroid [26]
(93-99% versus 92-98% of F1), with respect to the same validation
method (i.e., 10-fold CV).
6.4 Study II: detection over time
Recall that the main objective of our technique is that it can
sustain its detection capabilities (in terms of performance
numbers) over time. Thus, this study aims at testing DroidSpan
against this objective by training it with old malware set and
testing malicious apps developed in the following one to five years.
We intended to see whether how using older versus newer benign
samples in the training would affect the performance of
sustainable malware detectors. Thus, we used both the old and
new benign sets during the training, separately. Next, we examine
the classification performance in this setting by looking at the
numbers, and the sustainability, by focusing on the change trend
in the performance over years.
Classification performance. Table 4 shows the detailed results
on the classification performance of DroidSpan against the baseline
approach. Given each of the five relatively newer malware sets
(from 2013 through 2017) used for testing and each of the two
benign datasets used for training (along with the old malware set
consistently), we had ten rounds of independent testing. In the
table, the three metrics, precision (P), recall R, and F1 accuracy (F1)
are listed for each round, and each of the two techniques
compared. For example, when trained on OldBen+oldMal and
tested on oldBen+Mal16, the precision, recall, and F1 of MamaDroid
were 46.9%, 26.6%, and 34%, respectively. For each round, the better
performance numbers (between our work and the baseline) in any
metric were highlighted by bold face.
The upper half of the table shows the results when using the old
benign set for training. Both DroidSpan and MamaDroid exhibited
great performance (98% versus 93% F1) when detecting malware
developed just one year after the trained malware samples were
developed. For a time span of two years, the performance of both
techniques started dropping by about 5% in F1. Both techniques saw
the decrease in both precision and recall. However, the reason was
mainly because of the degraded precision (by 6%) for MamaDroid,
while for DroidSpan the main cause was the decrease in recall (by
9%). When detecting malware further into the feature, the results
reveal that DroidSpan remained highly accurately (with 93% F1) up
to four years. Even for a five-year span, it still attained a reasonable
F1 accuracy of 83%. Note that the precision was always high at
99%, and it was the drop in recall that led to the the reduction in
F1 accuracy. This is likely to be in line with the fact that dynamic
analysis tends to give precise results with imperfect recall (since
the analysis considers a subset of possible executions only). By
contrast, MamaDroid did not sustain beyond the two year span,
with F1 dropped to 70% in four years and 34% by the fifth year. The
main causes continued to the decrease in precision, although for
the five-year span it was the very low recall (26%) that caused the
poor F1 accuracy.
The bottom half of the table shows the results for using the new
benign sets in the training. In terms of the percentage numbers,
the performance of both techniques was lower (by 2-5% in F1)
than when the old benign set was involved in training. Yet the
comparative trends between the two techniques for each time span
did not change much, nor did other observations from the upper
half of the table (e.g., DroidSpan mainly dropped in recall while
MamaDroid in precision, except for the longest span). Overall, for
detecting malware two years in the future, DroidSpan attained 91%
F1 accuracy (versus 75% by MamaDroid). The contrasts between
our work and the baseline were 88% versus 68%, and 81% versus
33%, for four- and five-year spans, respectively.
It is worth noting that we confirmed, using different datasets,
that MamaDroid kept high performance (over 90%) for one year
only and reasonable performance (above 80%) for at most two years:
these were the findings from the original evaluation of MamaDroid.
Sustainability. Figures 3 and 4 depicts the trends of classification
performance changes in terms of F1 accuracy with DroidSpan
versus MamaDroid, for using the old and new benign sets for
training, respectively. The plotted data points were the same F1
numbers from Table 4. The two graphics clearly illustrate the
overall sustainability patterns of both techniques in one to five
years. As shown, while both classification approaches deteriorate
over time, ours did so much slower than the baseline. Not only
were the performance of DroidSpan always higher than
MamaDroid at any of the five time spans studied, overall the gap
enlarged continuously with the increase in the length of the time
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Table 4: Comparison of performance between the two techniques for detection over time
Training
dataset Techniques
Testing dataset
oldBen+Mal13 oldBen+Mal14 oldBen+Mal15 oldBen+Mal16 oldBen+Mal17
P R F1 P R F1 P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
oldBen+
oldMal
DroidSpan 0.999 0.979 0.989 0.999 0.881 0.937 0.999 0.875 0.933 0.999 0.870 0.930 0.999 0.709 0.830
MamaDroid 0.942 0.935 0.935 0.886 0.877 0.880 0.626 0.780 0.694 0.606 0.833 0.702 0.469 0.266 0.340
newBen+Mal13 newBen+Mal14 newBen+Mal15 newBen+Mal16 newBen+Mal17
newBen+
oldMal
DroidSpan 0.997 0.973 0.985 0.991 0.837 0.908 0.984 0.750 0.857 0.978 0.800 0.880 0.971 0.698 0.812
MamaDroid 0.863 0.999 0.927 0.667 0.846 0.746 0.564 0.780 0.655 0.545 0.885 0.675 0.473 0.261 0.337
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Figure 3: Classification performance (y axis) of DroidSpan
versusMamaDroid, trained on oldBen+oldMal, for detection
over five years (x axis).
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Figure 4: Classification performance (y axis) of DroidSpan
versus MamaDroid, trained on newBen+oldMal, for detec-
tion over five years (x axis).
span. These contrasts suggest that our work can sustain with high
accuracy much longer than, thus clearly outperforms in
sustainability, this state-of-the-art solution.
6.5 Study III: Resiliency
Since many Android apps, malicious ones in particular, were
obfuscated more or less (mainly in their code) [34], it is crucial for
a malware detector to be resilient to code obfuscation to be
practically useful. As we discussed earlier, DroidSpan is dynamic
while monitoring all calls (including reflective and
exception-driven ones) at runtime, it should be robust to typical
code obfuscation schemes such as string encryption, reflection,
and class/method renaming [25]. To verify this hypothesis, in this
study, we attempted to assess the resiliency of our technique to
obfuscation against the baseline, using the MalObf dataset. All the
three mentioned types of obfuscation schemes were applied in
each app of this dataset.
Trained on the oldBen+oldMal, DroidSpan has been able to
identify the malware in MalObf, with almost perfect performance
(99% precision, recall, and F1). This empirical result supports our
hypothesis above. We also intended to do this same study on
MamaDroid. However, the sophisticated analysis of FlowDroid [6]
underlying the feature computation step of MamaDroid failed at
any of the obfuscated apps due to the limitations of FlowDroid.
While we cannot compare the performance between the two
techniques against these obfuscated apps, as a static approach
MamaDroid is likely to be more vulnerable to obfuscation than our
dynamic technique.
6.6 Efficiency Results
We report the efficiency numbers with respect to all our datasets.
The overhead of DroidSpan is dominated by the cost for computing
the SAD profiles of the training samples. The instrumentation took
from 2 to 315 seconds (mean 33.9, std 36.7) per malicious app, with
slightly (10s on average) higher costs for benign apps. The profiling
took a constant time of 10 minutes per app. Extracting SAD features
from a trace took an average of 15s for an app. Given the small
feature set it used, DroidSpan only spent very short time (within
3s) on model training and testing with the RF algorithm. Beyond
the 128G traces in total for all the 5,934 apps (we currently simply
stored all traces in plain text), other storage costs were trivial (i.e.,
7M for storing all the feature files).
On the same datasets, we experienced efficiency difficulties with
MamaDroid in all its three steps. The static analysis cost of
FlowDroid is known to be substantial. Despite a configuration for
low analysis precision it used, MamaDroid took about 16 days to
finish the call-graph construction for our benchmarks (mean of
4min per app). For its best-performing (i.e., package) mode,
MamaDroid also appeared slow with feature computation due to
its very-high memory consumption as discussed in [26] (recall it
has 150K feature values per app). This step took almost 3 days in
our experiments, resulting in 11G feature files. The last step,
training and testing, again was expensive because of loading the
large feature files. For example, it spent about an hour for training
on the newBen+oldMal mixed dataset. These numbers, even
considering the per-app averages, are much higher than those
reported in [26] (with 40-core CPU and 128G RAM), possibly
because of our lower hardware configuration. Due to the
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dominating cost for tracing, DroidSpan tends to incur higher total
costs per app. However, the significantly higher sustainability and
performance along with better resiliency may justify the
reasonable extra costs.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss various factors that may affect the
validity of our results and performance of DroidSpan, along with
its limitations.
One validity threat lies in the benchmark selection in our studies:
the limited numbers of benign apps and malware used may not
represent all respective Android apps. For a dynamic analysis, our
dataset size is (at least among) the largest in the literature, but not
as large as many used for static Android analysis approaches. To
reduce this threat, we managed to obtain reasonably large datasets
and purposely chose apps from a diverse set of sources.
Results of dynamic analyses are commonly subject to the
availability and coverage of run-time inputs, which poses another
threat to our results (the characterization findings in particular).
The traces used in our studies may not well represent all the
behaviors of the apps. Profiling a large number of Android apps
(which needs an effective automatic input generator) with high
coverage is still an open research topic. To reduce this threat, we
have used best resources available to obtain high-coverage inputs
for our studies, at the cost of longer total time for using our
technique (i.e., 10min tracing per app). However, for the
characterization study, the most important findings were about the
evolutionary patterns of run-time app behaviors (rather than the
numbers themselves), which tend to be less sensitive to the input
coverage. For our malware detection technique, the high and
sustainable classification accuracy shown through extensive
experiments suggest even lesser dependence on the coverage.
Nevertheless, a minimal piece of app trace that is usable by our
technique is required for classifying the app.
A threat to validity of our conclusion is that the characterization
findings and the merits of DroidSpan may not be exactly observed
with different datasets. We attempted to reduce this risk through
the diversity of our datasets. The general consistency in the results
on MamaDroid between the authors’ original study and ours on
different datasets suggests that our study results may not be much
biased, which helps support our conclusion drawn from the results.
We have shown through a separate study (Study III) that our
technique appeared to be resilient to encryption, reflection, and
renaming attacks. DroidSpan could be vulnerable to other
advanced app obfuscation and malware evasion schemes. However,
it only relies on identifying source/sink APIs from execution traces
(instead of code). These APIs are part of the Android SDK classes,
obfuscating which is not currently feasible. In addition, tt is well
known that tricky malware can evade detection by withholding
their malicious behaviors when they find being executed on an
emulator. Our highly positive evaluation results obtained from
traces collected on an emulator suggests that emulator evasion
does not seem to much affect the effectiveness DroidSpan. We have
suggested that, due to the typically higher overhead of dynamic
analysis (for profiling), DroidSpan can take relatively longer time.
Another limitation is that substantial updates in the Android SDK
for source/sink APIs may affect the performance of our technique,
and thus would trigger retraining (with the updated source/sink
lists).
8 RELATEDWORK
We discuss prior works closely related to ours, on app characteriza-
tion and malware detection for Android.
Characterization of Android apps. Previous
characterization studies of Android apps mostly focused on
metrics extracted from the app code. For example, in [16], 1,100
popular apps were studied to understand their use and misuse of
private information of mobile phones and users through reverse
engineering. A few dynamic characterization studies exist, which
concern the installation and activation methods of malware
only [44] or execution structure of benign apps only [9, 11].
Another examples include the dynamic study [39] that profiles
apps in terms of their inter-component communications (ICC) and
network traffic. CopperDroid [35] can be used for characterizing
system calls in apps, and the recently developed toolkit in [10]
serves both static and dynamic characterizations.
In contrast, our characterization is purely dynamic, focusing on
run-time sensitive accesses in both benign and malicious apps.
More importantly, our characterization aims at a longitudinal
examination of the evolution of Android apps. The
characterization of evaluation datasets in [26] reveals the
evolutionary characteristics of both malware and benign apps also,
but it instead focuses on API calls in apps and is static.
Android Malware Detection. Numerous approaches have
been proposed for detecting Android malware, by statically
analyzing data and/or control flows [18, 21, 37, 42], API
use [2, 7, 40, 42, 43], and/or installation-time
permission [5, 7, 13, 31, 40]. ICCDetector [41] distinguishes
malware from benign apps based on their different patterns in
ICCs. Most recently, DroidSieve [33] used resource-centric features
to classify obfuscated apps, while MamaDroid [26] aimed at
sustainable detection, using a Markov model of API calls after
abstracting them to family and package levels.
Dynamic malware detectors have mainly exploited monitoring
system and/or API calls in apps [3, 8, 13], or high-level behaviors
exhibited through the usage of system resources such as file and
network access [32]. Some of these approaches used static features
in addition to dynamic ones [13, 24, 31]. Approaches relied on static
calls in app code are generally vulnerable to code obfuscation (e.g.,
reflection) [33].
As suggested by the study in [26], prior approaches are rarely
shown to be capable of sustainable detection. For example,
DroidAPIMiner [2], which was used as the baseline of MamaDroid,
did not even sustain its capabilities for a year without
retraining [26]. DroidSpan targets a better sustainability (and
resiliency) of malware detection than Mamadroid, using only
dynamic features based on the extent and distribution of exercised
sensitive accesses and vulnerable, method-level control flows in app
executions. As a static detector, MudFlow [7] builds a normal
behavior model based on the statement-level sensitive data flows
in a training set of benign apps in order to identify new malware.
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9 CONCLUSION
As malware continues to be rampant in Android threatening its
large user base, defending against Android malware is crucial.
Numerous approaches have been proposed, mostly training a
learning model to predict the label of novel apps. Yet, existing
approaches tend not to sustain without retraining, which however
is not practical for detecting emerging malware.
In this paper, we introduce DroidSpan, a novel malware
detection approach based on a new behavior profile of Android
apps that models the distribution of their sensitive accesses. We
start with a longitudinal characterization of this profile. Our
findings reveal consistent differences between benign apps and
malware over the past seven years, despite the evolution of both
groups. These findings explain why DroidSpan sustains high
accuracy for up to at least four years, without retraining, as also
supported by our extensive empirical evidences. We also showed
that DroidSpan outperforms the state-of-the-art peer approach
with demonstrated sustainability in terms of the length of
sustaining period for high accuracy and resilience to various
obfuscation schemes, at reasonable costs.
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